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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT














Presently before the Court is Defendant APWU Local #7156’s Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Complaint (Doc. #57) and Defendant APWU National AFL-CIO’s Motion to 
Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. #60), both filed on December 6, 2011. Plaintiff 
Rosemary Garity filed an Opposition (Doc. #69) on December 19, 2011. Defendants filed a 
Joint Reply (Doc. #70) on January 6, 2012.
I. BACKGROUND
The following factual recitation is derived from Plaintiff Rosemary Garity’s 
Amended Complaint. For purposes of Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court accepts 
Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007).
A. Plaintiff’s Employment and Impairments
Plaintiff Rosemary Garity is employed by the American Postal Worker’s Union 
(“the National APWU”) as vice-president of the southern district of Nevada. (Am. Compl. 


























APWU”) as a shop steward between January 2008 and January 12, 2011. (Id. at 4:19-20.) 
Plaintiff was a member of the Local APWU at all times relevant to this action. (Id. at 
4:20.) Plaintiff suffers from mental and physical impairments including: heel spurs, chest 
pains, chronic fatigue, sleep disturbance, myalgia, muscle spasms, osteoporosis, major 
depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, panic attacks, and cancer. (Id. at 4:26-5:1.)
In September 2010, Debra Blankenship (“Blankenship”) became the new 
Postmaster. (Id. at 22:26-23:2.) After Blankenship’s arrival, Plaintiff began to observe 
favoritism and disparate treatment in the office and decided to address it through the 
grievance system. (Id. at 23:1-2.) On November 10, 2010, Kathi Poulos (“Poulos”), the 
newly-elected president of the Local APWU, arrived after being voted in by a group whom 
Plaintiff labels the “favorite employees.” (Id. at 23:6-8.) On December 29, 2010, Poulos 
entered into an agreement with the United States Post Office management in Pahrump, 
Nevada (“Management”) to cut Plaintiff’s hours. (Id. at 23:11-13.) From December 2010 
through January 2011, Poulos secretly met with others to discuss removing Plaintiff from 
her position as shop steward because Plaintiff had begun to file grievances to address the 
favoritism and disparate treatment. (Id. at 23:14-24.)
On January 11, 2011, Plaintiff missed a grievance meeting in Las Vegas “due to 
[her] legs and feet locking up severely.” (Id. at 6:8-10.) That same day, Poulos informed 
Management that Poulos planned to remove Plaintiff from her position as shop steward for 
the Local APWU. (Id. at 24:15-17.) Management sent Plaintiff home early. (Id. at 24:16.) 
The next day, Poulos told Plaintiff “after that stunt you pulled yesterday” she was removing 
Plaintiff as shop steward for the Local APWU and appointing herself to fill the position.
(Id. at 6:10-12, 24:19-20.)
B. Plaintiff’s Grievances
Plaintiff asked APWU officials to file dozens of grievances on her behalf.



























14:22-19:12.) Of the grievances filed, Poulos assured Plaintiff that all the grievances were 
valid, but Poulos later withdrew over forty of these grievances. (Id. at 20:2-22:20.) In one 
instance, on January 22, 2011, Poulos told Plaintiff that another employee wanted Poulos to 
withdraw Plaintiff’s grievances regarding discrimination and retaliation, which Poulos did. 
(Id. at 26:3-19.) Poulos was openly hostile towards Plaintiff every time she requested that 
Poulos file a grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf, and Poulos told Plaintiff that she was the only 
one having problems. (Id. at 11:6-8.) Poulos also refused to address Management’s 
“continual and constant mental abuse/harassment” of Plaintiff. (Id. at 11:1-2.) On 
February 1, 2011, Plaintiff approached the alternate shop steward, Al Weyen (“Weyen”), to 
file multiple grievances but he refused to investigate and the time limits on the grievances 
lapsed. (Id. at 27:19-23.) Furthermore, the National APWU business agents James 
Scoggins (“Scoggins”) and Gilbert Ybarra (“Ybarra”) withdrew grievances, settled 
grievances in favor of Management, and advised Poulos to withdraw and not file 
grievances on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Id. at 5:8-11, 10:9-11.)
Many of Plaintiff’s grievances related to adverse scheduling. Plaintiff repeatedly 
filed grievances relating to the cutting of her hours and the “criminal delay” of mail. (See, 
e.g., id. at 15:8-20.) Poulos and Management scheduled Plaintiff to work irregular hours. 
(See, e.g., id. at 28:2-3.) During a discussion between Poulos and Plaintiff on March 23, 
2011, Poulos stated that Plaintiff was restricted to working four hours a day, four days a 
week; Plaintiff disagreed. (Id. at 30:23-27.) Poulos also stated that it was better for 
Plaintiff’s chronic fatigue and sleep apnea to start work later in the day, but Plaintiff argued 
that it was actually better for her condition if she started work earlier in the day. (Id. at 
31:1-3.) Poulos indicated that Plaintiff’s work restrictions kept changing based on 
Management’s instructions to Poulos. (Id. at 30:28-31:1.)
Plaintiff also grieved the quality of the representation she received from 



























2011, Management refused to sign Plaintiff’s request for representation. (Id. at 33:1-2.)
On May 2, 2011, the regional coordinator assigned Jerry Bevens (“Bevens”), President of 
APWU Local #761, as Plaintiff’s new representative for disciplinary grievances. (Id. at 
33:27-28, 34:24.)
C. Plaintiff’s Discipline
On April 20, 2011, Poulos wrote a three-page statement to Management 
regarding Plaintiff. (Id. at 32:23-25.) Management used this letter in its decision to 
suspend Plaintiff for thirty days. (Id. at 32:25-26.) Plaintiff received her thirty day 
suspension letter on April 28, 2011. (Id. at 33:17-18.) On May 9, 2011, Plaintiff received a 
notice of removal. (Id. at 34:7-9.) On May 30, 2011, Bevens wrote a letter stating that 
Plaintiff had “no chance of surviving the discipline without outside representation” and that 
Poulos and Raydell Moore, ex-regional coordinator and technical advisor to the Local 
APWU, were refusing to cooperate with the investigation and were working with 
Blankenship and Management instead of the APWU. (Id. at 34:24-28.) On June 11, 2011, 
Plaintiff was removed from the Postal Service. (Id. at 35:10.) Plaintiff claims she was 
disciplined for requesting alternative representation from the APWU, time off, and 
schedule changes; Poulos’s statements to Management; and Plaintiff’s disabilities. (Id. at 
33:1-5, 8:22-24, 32:23-26.)
After Plaintiff’s removal, National APWU business agent Shirley Taylor 
(“Taylor”) negotiated a settlement on Plaintiff’s behalf wherein Plaintiff would be paid for 
four hours a day from June 25, 2011 through September, 2011. (Id. at 7:26-27.) Plaintiff 
asked Taylor if she would be removed, reinstated, or retired, and Taylor responded no. (Id. 
at 7:28-8:1.) Taylor told Plaintiff she could not return to work because Plaintiff had 
applied for disability retirement. (Id. at 8:12-13.) Taylor also told Plaintiff that her doctor 
stated Plaintiff could not work. (Id. at 8:15-16.) Plaintiff alleges that many employees 



























that she could not work, she could perform her job duties if properly accommodated, and 
Plaintiffs grievance had nothing to do with her restrictions but instead her grievance relates 
to Plaintiff’s unjust removal. (Id. at 8:13-22.)
On August 10, 2011, Poulos and Danielle Bennett (“Bennett”), another shop 
steward, announced that they had agreed to new work restrictions for Plaintiff: fewer than 
forty hours a week, six days a week. (Id. at 2:4-5, 35:24-25.) Plaintiff requested Bennett 
file a grievance regarding the new restrictions, but Bennett told Plaintiff that she was not 
Plaintiff’s shop steward. (Id. at 35:26-27.) Plaintiff asked Poulos to file a grievance 
regarding these restrictions, but Poulos refused as well. (Id. at 35:28-36:2.) In August 
2011, National APWU business agent Scoggins agreed to the six-day a week assignment 
for Plaintiff. (Id. at 4:6-8, 36:5-6.) Plaintiff was not happy with this new assignment 
because it was contrary to a prior position taken by the National APWU and all but one 
person at the August union meeting viewed this new assignment as undesirable. (Id. at 4:6­
12, 36:6-7.) The Postal Service reinstated Plaintiff on September 27, 2011. (Id. at 36:13.)
After Plaintiff’s reinstatement, on October 18, 2011, a shop steward bullied 
Plaintiff, and in response, Plaintiff called threat assessment because she was crying 
uncontrollably. (Id. at 36:17-20.) On October 21, 2011, Plaintiff had a mental breakdown 
because she was unable to handle any more abuse. (Id. at 36:21.) From the end of October 
to the beginning of November 2011, Plaintiff took vacation time, sick leave, and leave 
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to remove herself from the 
environment. (Id. at 36:22-23.)
D. History of the Present Action
On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity 
(“EEO”) complaint against the APWU. (Id. at 28:21.) On March 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed 
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Id. at 30:16.) 



























2011, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue letter. (Id. at 35:11; Mot. for 
Leave (Doc. #74).)
On July 6, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. #1) in this Court against 
Defendants, which this Court dismissed without prejudice for insufficient service of 
process and failure to state a claim. (Order (Doc #53).) The Court ordered Plaintiff to 
effect proper service by November 28, 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed an Amended 
Complaint (Doc. #54) on November 15, 2011. Plaintiff filed proof of service on the 
National APWU on December 5, 2011 and the Local APWU on December 9, 2011. (Proof 
of Serv. (Doc. #56); Proof of Serv. (Doc. #67).) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts 
violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (“Title VII”); the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (“ADA”); the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”); 
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges: disability 
discrimination in violation of Title VII (counts I, IV, and V); retaliation in violation of Title 
VII (count II); hostile work environment in violation of Title VII (count III); intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (count VI); negligent retention (count VI)1; and conspiracy 
to violate her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (count VII).
Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Defendants 
argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In addition, the 
National APWU argues Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and the 
National APWU is not vicariously liable for the Local APWU’s conduct. The Local 
APWU asserts that Plaintiff has not filed proof of service on the Local APWU. Plaintiff 
responds that she has sufficiently pled facts, if found to be true, to establish a prima facie 
case for each of her causes of action. Plaintiff also argues she exhausted her administrative 
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remedies, but does not respond to the Local APWU’s proof of service argument.2
II. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Grounds for Dismissal
1. Proof of Service
The Local APWU argues that Plaintiff has not filed proof of service upon the 
Local APWU in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, and thus the Court 
must dismiss all claims against the Local APWU. Plaintiff does not respond.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires that a plaintiff serve a defendant 
“within 120 days after the complaint is filed.” Rule 4(l)(1) provides that “[u]nless service 
is waived, proof of service must be made to the court. Except for service by a United 
States marshal or deputy marshal, proof must be by the server’s affidavit.”
Here, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on November 15, 2011. (Am. 
Compl. (Doc. #54).) On December 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed proof of service of the Amended 
Complaint on the National APWU, including an affidavit by the process server, stating that 
he served the National APWU on November 22, 2011. (Proof of Serv. (Doc. #56).) 
Although Plaintiff did not file proof of service on the Local APWU prior to the Local 
APWU filing its Motion to Dismiss, on December 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed proof of service 
on the Local APWU, including a statement by the server that he served the Local APWU 
on December 7, 2011. (Proof of Serv. (Doc. #67).) December 5 and 9, 2011fall within the 
120 day time period for service under Rule 4(m). Therefore, the Court will deny the Local 
APWU’s Motion to Dismiss for improper service.
2 Plaintiff attaches four letters to her Opposition. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) “gives 
courts the discretion to accept and consider extrinsic materials offered in connection with [a motion 
to dismiss], and to convert the motion to one for summary judgment.” Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. 
Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court declines to consider the evidence 





























The National APWU argues that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative 
remedies with respect to any claim against the National APWU because she did not name 
the National APWU in her EEOC complaint. Plaintiff responds that she filed a charge 
against both Defendants, and even so, the claims against the National APWU were 
reasonably expected to grow out of the allegations presented to the EEOC.
To bring an ADA claim for disability discrimination,3 a plaintiff must first 
exhaust her administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 12117(a) (incorporating the 
Title VII exhaustion requirement into Title I of the ADA); Sommatino v. United States, 255 
F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 2001). To illustrate, a federal employee must notify an EEO 
counselor of the discrimination within forty-five days of the alleged conduct, and if the 
matter remains unresolved, the employee may file a formal complaint with the EEOC. 
Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708. This exhaustion requirement is statutory rather than 
jurisdictional. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). But,
3 Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Plaintiff describes her claims as Title VII claims for discrimination based on 
disability, but disability is not a protected class under Title VII. However, at the beginning o f her 
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated her rights under the ADA. The 
ADA prohibits discrimination against employees with disabilities by certain employers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12111(5), 12112(a). The Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’ s Title VII claims (counts I to V) as 
ADA claims. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has 
instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (quotation 
omitted)).
Plaintiff also alleges Defendants violated her rights under the Rehab Act, which prohibits 
discrimination against employees with disabilities by federal employers, federal contractors, and 
recipients of federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794; Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 
654 F.3d 903, 910 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants are federal 
employers, federal contractors, or recipients o f federal financial assistance. As such, the Court will 
not construe Plaintiff’ s Title VII claims as Rehab Act claims. Likewise, Plaintiff alleges Defendants 
violated her rights under the ADAAA; however, the ADAAA merely expanded the definition of 
“disability” under the ADA. Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 




























substantial compliance with the presentment requirements of a discrimination complaint is 
a jurisdictional prerequisite. Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708.
The district court’s jurisdiction is limited to the scope of the EEOC charge and 
investigation, claims that are “‘like or reasonably related’ to the allegations made in the 
EEOC charge,” and claims that “can reasonably be expected to grow out o f’ the EEOC 
charge and investigation. Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(quotations omitted). More specifically, district courts have jurisdiction over claims against 
parties named in the EEOC charge, parties involved in the conduct giving rise to the EEOC 
charge, and parties that should have anticipated that the plaintiff would bring suit against 
them. Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff uses the generic term “APWU” in her EEOC Charge of 
Discrimination. (Decl. of Anton Hajjar in Supp. of Defs.’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. #13), 
Ex. 1.) Likewise, in her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she filed an “EEO 
complaint against the APWU” and “EEOC charges [] against [the] APWU.” (Am. Compl. 
at 28:21, 30:16.) . Plaintiff does not specify in her Amended Complaint whether her EEO 
complaint and EEOC charges were against the National APWU, the Local APWU, or both. 
Construing Plaintiff’s pro se Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff 
filed an EEO complaint and EEOC charges against both Defendants.
But even assuming Plaintiff did not name the National APWU in her EEO 
complaint and EEOC charges, the National APWU was involved in the acts giving rise to 
the EEOC claims and should have anticipated that Plaintiff would bring suit against it. For 
example, National APWU business agents Scoggins and Ybarra withdrew grievances, 
settled grievances in favor of Management, and advised Poulos to withdraw and not file 
grievances on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Id. at 5:8-11, 10:9-11.) Accordingly, the Court has 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, and thus, the Court will deny the 



























B. Substantive Grounds for Dismissal
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move the 
Court for the dismissal of a complaint based upon its “failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.” In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, 
“all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.” Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 
F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). To succeed on such a motion, the defendant must show the 
plaintiff does not make sufficient factual allegations to establish a plausible entitlement to 
relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
Such allegations must amount to “more than labels and conclusions, [or] a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “In 
determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 
complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 
(9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, 
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court “must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt” 
in construing a pro se complaint. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t. 839 F.2d 621, 623 
(9th Cir. 1988).
1. Disability Discrimination—Counts I, IV, and V
Defendants contend Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not allege facts 
establishing that the alleged discriminatory conduct was because of Plaintiff’s disability. 
The National APWU in particular argues that Plaintiff does not allege facts tying the 



























under no affirmative duty to combat discrimination. Even so, Defendants contend they 
have not taken adverse action or any type of action that would dissuade a reasonable 
employee from engaging in a protected activity. In response, Plaintiff argues that she (1) 
suffers from a disability because her physical and mental impairments substantially limit 
her major life activities and Defendants knew about these impairments; (2) was qualified 
for and satisfied the requirements of her position; (3) requested an accommodation; and (4) 
suffered adverse employment actions because of her disability.
The ADA provides, in relevant part, “No covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] discharge of 
employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines discrimination as “not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered 
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To state a prima 
facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) she is disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA, (2) she is a qualified individual, and (3) she suffered an adverse 
employment action because of her disability. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 
1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA and a qualified individual. However, Defendants dispute 
whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.
a. Adverse Employment Action
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not specifically 
defined “adverse employment action” for purposes of an ADA discrimination claim. But, 
“[i]t is beyond challenge that a person’s termination is considered an adverse employment 
action.” Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001). 



























disability discrimination claim. See Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 
F.3d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). Adverse employment actions also include “refusing to 
make reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disabilities.” Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 
602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Specifically, an employer 
discriminates by “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or 
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Unions shall not “cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against 
an individual in violation of [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3). More specifically, 
unions may be liable for refusing to file grievances concerning discrimination. Goodman v. 
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987), superceded by statute on other grounds as 
recognized in Johnson v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 
2011)). Unions also may be liable for acquiescing or joining in an employer’s 
discriminatory practices. Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 
1982). The United States Supreme Court has applied these rules of union liability to other 
federal anti-discrimination laws. 14 Penn Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 272 (2009) 
(discussing union liability generally under federal anti-discrimination laws and applying 
these rules specifically to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)).
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took adverse 
employment action against Plaintiff by refusing to file grievances alleging discrimination 
and by joining in Management’s discriminatory practices. (Am. Compl. at 4:15-17, 9:13­
23, 10:9-11.) Plaintiff alleges the following constitute adverse employment actions taken 
by Management: cut hours, adverse scheduling, failure to accommodate, constructive 



























9:13-23.) Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged 
sufficient facts to support a claim of adverse employment action. Management refused to 
accommodate Plaintiff, suspended Plaintiff, and ultimately removed Plaintiff, all of which 
constitute adverse employment actions. Similarly, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to 
support a claim that Defendants are liable for Management’s discriminatory practices. 
Defendants refused to file grievances and joined in Management’s discriminatory practices. 
For example, Poulos communicated with Plaintiff regarding adverse scheduling and work 
restrictions and wrote a three-page statement to Management, which Plaintiff alleges 
Management used in making its decision to suspend and remove Plaintiff.
b. “Because of” Plaintiff’s Disability
An employer takes an adverse action “because o f’ the plaintiff’s disability if the 
action was motivated, even in part, by animus towards the plaintiff’s disability or request 
for accommodation. Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, 
the ADA applies when the plaintiff’s “disability is one factor, but not the only factor, 
motivating an adverse employment action.” Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 
n.63 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). But a decision motivated by factors merely 
related to the plaintiff’s disability is not prohibited by the ADA. See Lopez v. Pac. Mar. 
Ass’n, 657 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 2011).
Here, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff 
has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that Defendants’ refusals to file grievances 
and involvement in Management’s discriminatory practices were motivated, at least in part, 
by animus towards Plaintiff’s disabilities or requests for accommodation. In particular, 
Poulos removed Plaintiff as shop steward the day after Plaintiff did not attend a grievance 
meeting because Plaintiff’s legs and feet locked up severely. (Am. Compl. at 6:8-12, 
24:15-17, 19-20.) Poulos referred to Plaintiff’s condition as a “stunt.” (Id. at 6:10-12.) 



























(Id. at 10:9-11, 26:5-9, 17.) Plaintiff requested an accommodation due to her medical 
conditions, and on the same day Weyen refused to file grievances. (Id. at 27:16-23.)
Poulos stated that the work restrictions imposed by Management were due to Plaintiff’s 
medical conditions and Poulos refused to file grievances opposing these work restrictions. 
(Id. at 30:23-28, 31:1-8.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a 
plausible disability discrimination claim under the ADA. The Court will deny Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims.
2. Retaliation—Count II
To state a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate “(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and 
(3) a causal link between the two.” Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1269 
(9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff engages in a protected activity by pursuing her rights under the 
ADA, for example, by filing union grievances and EEOC charges. Pardi v. Kaiser Found. 
Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). For purposes of an ADA retaliation claim, an 
action constitutes an adverse employment action if it is “reasonably likely to deter 
employees from engaging in protected activity.” Id. (quotation omitted). Lastly, a casual 
link can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as an employer’s knowledge and 
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 
Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (employer was aware of the 
plaintiff’s EEOC complaint and took adverse employment action within three months of 
filing); see also Bell v. Clackamas Cnty., 341 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
temporal proximity alone can be sufficient).
Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to support a claim that she engaged in protected 
activity by filing union grievances and EEOC charges. As discussed above, Plaintiff also 
has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that Management took adverse employment 



























Defendants refused to file grievances on Plaintiff’s behalf and joined in Management’s 
discriminatory practices. Lastly, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to infer a causal link 
between Plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse employment action because 
Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s EEOC charges and Management removed Plaintiff 
fewer than three months after she filed EEOC charges. Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged 
sufficient facts to support a plausible retaliation claim under the ADA. The Court will deny 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
3. Hostile Work Environment—Count III 
It is unsettled whether a cause of action for a hostile work environment claim 
exists under the ADA. Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Assuming without deciding that such a claim exists, courts would likely apply Title VII 
law. See McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998). 
Consequently, if such a claim exists, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to 
unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment complained of was 
based on her disability or disabilities; (4) that the harassment 
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; 
and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the 
harassment and failed to take prompt, remedial action.
Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235-236 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation
omitted). An “objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively
offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the
victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787
(1998). The Court considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether
conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917,
923 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court considers “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;



























524 U.S. at 787-88 (quotation omitted). However, anti-discrimination laws are not a 
general civility code, therefore, “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents 
(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and 
conditions of employment.” Id. at 788 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Poulos was openly hostile 
towards Plaintiff every time she requested that Poulos file a grievance on her behalf, and 
Poulos told Plaintiff that she was the only one having problems. (Am. Compl. at 11:6-8.) 
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that this was more than an offensive 
utterance. Plaintiff also alleges Poulos refused to address Management’s “continual and 
constant mental abuse/harassment.” (Id. at 11:1-2.) After her reinstatement, Plaintiff called 
threat assessment to report bullying from the APWU shop steward and a co-worker. (Id. at 
36:17-20.) Three days later, Plaintiff alleges she had a mental breakdown because of the 
abuse, after which she took vacation and sick leave to remove herself from the 
environment. (Id. at 36:21-22.) Although Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to demonstrate 
that she subjectively found her work environment hostile and abusive, Plaintiff does not 
allege specific incidents of mental abuse, harassment, or bullying sufficient for the Court to 
evaluate whether a reasonable person would find the work environment hostile and abusive. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged that the mental abuse, harassment, or bullying was 
based on her disability. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support 
a hostile work environment claim, and the Court will grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss 
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Count VI
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) 
claim does not amount to an intentional infliction tort and is preempted by § 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Plaintiff responds that Defendants’ conduct 



























Management to suspend and remove Plaintiff, and refusal to mediate at the EEOC—and 
such conduct caused emotional distress, evidenced by Plaintiff’s psychological care and 
medication. Plaintiff also argues that the Court need not interpret the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (“CBA”) to evaluate whether Defendant extinguished Plaintiff’s rights and 
colluded with Management.
To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff 
must prove: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless 
disregard for, causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff’s having suffered severe or 
extreme emotional distress and (3) actual or proximate causation.” Star v. Rabello, 625 
P.2d 90, 91-92 (Nev. 1981). Extreme and outrageous conduct exceeds “all bounds of 
decency” and is “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Maduike v. Agency Rent- 
A-Car, 953 P.2d 24, 26 (Nev. 1998) (quotation omitted). Persons must be expected and 
required to tolerate occasional acts, which are inconsiderate and unkind. Id. “Liability for 
emotional distress will not extend to ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty 
oppressions, or other trivialities.’” Candelore v. Clark Cnty. Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 
591 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d).
Plaintiff argues that the same conduct that gives rise to her discrimination claims 
forms the basis of her IIED claim. These acts, although arguably offensive, inconsiderate, 
and unkind, do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous such that they exceed “all 
bounds of decency.” “Discriminatory employment practices are wrong and federal law 
makes such conduct unlawful and provides for relief; however, the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is not intended to reach every discrimination claim.” Alam 
v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993). Therefore, the Court will 
grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s IIED claim.
5. Negligent Retention—Count VI



























negligently retained by the APWU. Plaintiff responds that the National APWU was 
negligent in failing to investigate national and local officials’ discriminatory conduct of 
which the National APWU was aware, failing to suspend officials for such conduct, and 
retaining officials despite such conduct.
An employer has a general duty to use reasonable care in the retention of 
employees to ensure that employees are fit for their positions. Hall v. SSF, Inc., 930 P.2d 
94, 99 (Nev. 1996). The employer breaches this duty when the employer hires or retains an 
employee that the employer knew or should have known might cause harm to others. See 
id. at 98-99; see also Chavez v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 396 F.3d 1088, 1099 (10th Cir. 
2005), overruled on other grounds by Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 
F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retained national and local officials 
despite being aware that such officials were discriminating and otherwise causing harm to 
Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state a claim for negligent retention. 
Defendants have not offered support for their contention that an employer cannot 
negligently retain an elected official. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligent retention claim.
7. Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights—Count VII 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
should be dismissed because § 1985 is unavailable as a remedy for Title VII violations. 
Plaintiff does not respond to this position; rather, Plaintiff argues that she has established a 
prima facie case of conspiracy under § 1985 by circumstantial evidence.
Section 1985(3) provides a remedy for certain types of conspiracies as described 
within the statute;4 it does not provide a remedy for a claim of conspiracy to violate Title



























VII. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372-78 (1979), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters.,
Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1994). Title VII remedies are not available to a plaintiff 
unless that plaintiff exhausts her administrative remedies. Id. at 372-73. For example, as 
discussed above, a plaintiff must file a claim with the EEOC before bringing suit for 
discrimination. If a plaintiff could assert a Title VII violation through § 1985, then the 
plaintiff could circumvent the administrative requirements set forth in Title VII. Id. at 375­
76. Thus, “deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of 
action under § 1985(3).” Id. at 378.
Because the same administrative requirements set forth in Title VII apply to the 
ADA under 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), the Supreme Court's reasoning in Novotny applies to a 
claim of conspiracy to violate the ADA. Adler v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C., 13 F. Supp. 2d 
912, 941-43 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (applying Novotny to claims of conspiracy to violate the 
ADA and ADEA), abrogated on other grounds by Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 
F.3d 964, 970 n.4 (8th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot and Mannino, P.C., 738 
F. Supp. 937, 940-41 (W.D. Pa. 1989), affd. 897 F.2d 522 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
811 (1990) (applying Novotny to a claim of conspiracy to violate the ADEA); Brownfield 
v. Yellow Freight Svs., No. 98-15775, 1999 WL 439310, at *1 (9th Cir. June 17, 1999) 
(applying Novotny to claims of conspiracy to violate Title VII and the ADA). Therefore, § 
1985(3) does not provide a remedy for a claim of conspiracy to violate the ADA, and the 
Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1985 claim.
(1) ‘conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another' (2) ‘for 
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of 
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.' 
It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done 
‘any act in furtherance of the object of (the) conspiracy,' whereby another was (4a) 
‘injured in hisperson or property' or (4b) ‘deprived of having and exercising any right 
or privilege o f  a citizen of the United States.



























Section 1986 imposes liability on persons who have knowledge of an impending 
violation of § 1985 and have power to prevent the violation but neglect or refuse to do so.5 
Karim-Panahi. 839 F.2d at 626. “A claim can be stated under section 1986 only if the 
complaint contains a valid claim under section 1985.” Id. Because Plaintiff fails to state a 
valid claim under § 1985. the Court will grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
§ 1986 claim.6
8. Vicarious Liability
Defendants argue the National APWU is not vicariously liable for the Local 
APWU’s conduct simply by virtue of their affiliation. and Plaintiff’s general statements 
that the National APWU business agents were agents of the Local APWU are insufficient 
to state a claim of vicarious liability. Plaintiff responds that she has alleged facts that 
demonstrate that the National APWU was making decisions for the Local APWU. For 
example. the National APWU regularly advised the Local APWU officials. the National 
APWU colluded with the Local APWU officials. and the National APWU withdrew 
grievances.
Courts use principles of common-law agency to determine whether an 
international union is vicariously liable for the actions of its local subsidiary. Carbon Fuel 
Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am.. 444 U.S. 212. 216-217 (1979).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides:
Every person who. having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done. and 
mentioned in section 1985 of this title. are about to be committed. and having power 
to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same. neglects or refuses so to 
do. if  such wrongful act be committed. shall be liable to the party injured. or his legal 
representatives. for all damages caused by such wrongful act. which such person by 
reasonable diligence could have prevented . . . .
6 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983; however. 
neither statute applies to this action. Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in the making and 
enforcing of contracts. Section 1983 prohibits violations of rights secured by the Constitution by 
persons acting under color of law. Plaintiff does not allege race discrimination. nor does Plaintiff 
allege Defendants acted under color of law. The Court will construe Plaintiff’ s conspiracy claim as 



























Thus, if the local engages in illegal conduct in furtherance of its role as 
an agent of the international, the international will be liable for the 
local’s actions. . . . However, if the local exercises considerable 
autonomy in conducting its affairs, it cannot be regarded as an agent of 
the international, and the international accordingly cannot be held 
liable under an agency theory for the local’s actions.
Laughon v. lnt’1 Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emps., 248 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2001). An 
international union may be liable for a local subsidiary if the international union 
“instigated, supported, ratified or encouraged the [l]ocal’s activities.” Moore v. Local 
Union 569 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 989 F.2d 1534, 1543 (9th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts that show the National APWU instigated, 
supported, ratified, or encouraged the Local APWU’s activities. As discussed above, the 
National APWU was involved in withdrawing grievances, refusing to file grievances, and 
disciplining Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court will deny the National APWU’s Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant APWU National AFL-CIO’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. #60) and Defendant Local APWU #7156’s 
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. #57) are hereby GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part. The Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims of hostile work 
environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
and § 1986. The Motions are DENIED in all other respects.
DATED: June 18, 2012
PHILIP M. PRO
United States District Judge
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